Our main recommendations
| Recommendation I: Military delivers Aid & Security Action Plan (ASAP) |
Canada should develop an Aid & Security Action Plan (ASAP) for Kandahar, focusing on targeted
humanitarian aid and enhanced medical treatment capacity through mobile field hospitals, a
rebuilt and re-furbished Mirwais Hospital and medical training programmes. Food aid and
medical aid will directly improve the relationships with the Afghan people in Kandahar and will
positively affect the security mission in the province. Emergency poverty relief should be a
priority for the Canadian mission. Given the dire humanitarian situation and negative security
environment in Kandahar, the Canadian Government should immediately empower the Canadian
military to secure the delivery of Canada-funded food aid and other supplies to Kandahar’s
people. Where there are no local or international aid organisations present, the Canadian
soldiers should be involved in the actual delivery of humanitarian aid.
| Recommendation II: Canada should convene an emergency NATO meeting to discuss the hearts and minds strategy for Afghanistan |
Canada should play a leading role within NATO to create a new balance between military and
humanitarian efforts within the stabilisation strategy for Afghanistan. Economic-focused
humanitarian interventions should be placed at the core of military planning as a way to pursue
an effective hearts and minds strategy. The core challenge is to show the people that the
international community is addressing their most basic needs. So far, the failure to do so has
given the Taliban a strategic advantage over international troops. A focus on economic
humanitarian aid will defuse tensions and create support for the international presence and the
central government within rural communities. It will also reduce the growing control that the
Taliban exert over those communities, making the troops’ missions safer.
The following issues should inter alia be discussed as part of the agenda of the emergency
NATO meeting:
Ways to further increase the non-military role of ISAF forces in terms of humanitarian aid
delivery and short-term impact of development;
Increased burden sharing among NATO and non-NATO countries, and the lifting of national
caveats on troop deployments;
Ways to double ISAF troops to 80,000 including more non-NATO troops and troops from
Muslim countries;
The necessity for NATO to operate in the border regions on Pakistani territory to be able to
effectively combat the Taliban insurgency and thwart their logistical and recruiting
operations;
Ways for NATO to influence the Afghan Government and international community in order
to develop and implement sound counter-narcotics measures that are compatible with
NATO’s stabilisation, reconstruction and hearts and minds mission.
| Recommendation III: Decrease civilian casualties and introduce emergency treatment of civilians injured in fighting and bombings |
Increased incidents involving civilian casualties, primarily in bombing raids, have predictably
proven to be detrimental in winning the support and trust of the Afghan people, and have
caused enormous suffering for the people of Kandahar. We must adopt a policy of zero civilian
casualties. Air strikes must be limited to those instances where the objective is well defined
and civilians will not be victimised. The deployment of highly skilled military paramedics must
be implemented immediately in southern Afghanistan. These paramedics would locate,
transport, and stabilize casualties of war in liaison with the armed forces and should also be
used to train Afghan women and men as future paramedics.
| Recommendation IV: Achievement of measures of success defines withdrawal date |
Canada should establish clear objectives and corresponding measures of success for its
humanitarian, stabilisation and reconstruction work in Afghanistan and should make both its
troop commitment and a future end date of its mission dependent on measurable progress in
these fields. Key indicators should include health-care, education, and training of ANA/ANP.
Canada should stay in Afghanistan until the job is done. To leave before then, can easily be
seen as a manifestation of the West’s ‘disposable’ and arrogant attitude toward the people of
Afghanistan, a fickle abandonment of our “most significant foreign policy endeavour”, and a
sad commentary on the value of the Canadian lives already sacrificed.
| Recommendation V: Sound counter-narcotics policies |
Canada must take a leadership role in support of President Karzai against chemical spraying of
poppy crops. Chemical spraying of poppy growing areas would be disastrous for the Canadian
hearts and minds mission. An opinion poll conducted in August 2007 by Ipsos Reid showed that
82 per cent of the Canadian public opposed chemical spraying.1 54 per cent opposed forced
crop eradication altogether.
Canada should support the implementation of a scientific Poppy for Medicine pilot project
in Kandahar province to investigate the positive benefits of local morphine production on
farming communities´ security and development. The Ipsos Reid opinion poll further showed
that 79 per cent of Canadians support a
Poppy for Medicine pilot projects and 70 per cent thinks
Prime Minister Harper should support this short-term economic development tool. At the same
time Canada should invest further in alternative livelihoods and diversification of the rural
economy.
The European Parliament
recently adopted a Recommendation to the Council of the
European Union endorsing a scientific pilot project to further investigate the possibilities
for strictly- controlled morphine production in Afghanistan.2 The Parliament also expressed
the Europe-wide consensus that chemical spraying of poppy crops should not be implemented
in the war-ravaged country.
| Recommendation VI: The Canadian Government should empower Canadian citizens to help Afghans through exchange and development programmes |
The Canadian Government should do more to empower Canadian citizens to help Afghanistan.
For this purpose, it should build on its “Canada Corps” initiative and broaden this approach
with a proper infrastructure that allows Canadian individuals and aid organisations to maximise
their role and impact in the Afghan reconstruction and development process. Stimulating help
programmes and professional exchanges between Canadians and Afghans will not only increase
mutual understanding, but will also empower more Canadians to directly provide support to
communities in Kandahar, creating stronger popular support for a difficult but necessary
mission. The Canadian Government should also investigate ways to encourage private
investment by Canadian entities, for example through a system of tax credits.