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1.3 Neutralising terror in Iraq: isolate extremists and implement microsecurity initiatives
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Build on current small security successes to enable grassroots micro-security initiatives
The relative calm afforded by the mid-2007 surge of US troops in Iraq provides an
opportunity for the Coalition to support the development of democracy in Iraq by
cementing the positive effects of recent security developments such as the co-opting of
local groups in security management and the ongoing evolution of the Concerned Local
Citizens across sectarian lines. However, caution must be exercised to ensure that the
inclusion of local groups in the provision of security does not equate to (and is not
perceived by Iraqis as equating to) international support for sectarian divisions within
Iraq’s institutions, because such divisions directly contradict the basic democratic
principles that must be embedded within the country’s structures and institutions of
governance.
There now exists an opportunity to break down sectarian militia blocs into individual
groups, and in doing so, create the space to implement the grassroots micro-security
initiatives necessary to neutralise mechanisms of self-sustaining internal violence, and to
draw Iraq’s various communities back together again. Isolating and defeating the most
extreme armed groups and militias will enable the Coalition to devote energy and resources
to securing the development of the small-medium enterprises in Iraq communities that will
provide jobs for young Iraqi men who would otherwise seek work with militias.
“Unemployed people join the militias for the money.”
Unemployed, 20
Baghdad, May 2008
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Divide to conquer Iraq’s militias and armed groups
The armed groups and militias currently operating in Iraq can be classified into three main
layers, divided according to level of affiliation with members of the Iraqi government and
its security forces, the United States military, or the Iranian security forces. Each tier is
further divided by ethno-sectarian leanings. Although some groups remain militantly
opposed to both the Shia-dominated Iraq government and its US supporters, many groups
are either directly affiliated with political parties within the current Iraq parliament (those
groups in the green zone of the following diagram), or have begun to demonstrate a willingness
to enhance their legitimacy by operating within Iraq’s existing formal political structures.
As such, the current configuration of Iraq’s militias and armed groups represents an
important opportunity for the Iraq government and its allies to stabilise the country’s
security and political landscapes. Positive engagement with middle layer (orange) armed
groups could provide the political space within which to conduct the targeted counterinsurgency
and counter-terrorist efforts against the (red) most violent of the Iran-backed
Shia “special groups” militias, former Baathist Regime elements, and Al Qaeda in Iraq.
Why reach out to mid-level armed groups now?
Currently, the mid-layer groups remain somewhat homogenous and the leaders (where they
exist) continue to have some measure of control over, or at least access to, the most
extreme elements of the groups. However, this situation is unlikely to remain static.
Iran is actively courting the more extreme elements of al-Sadr’s Jaish al Mahdi group as a
hedge against the potential political failure of its current ally SIIC. It could prove
extremely difficult to reach out to these groups once they are under Iran control –
particularly if the United States maintains its stance of ignoring Iran.
“Iran and the USA are the cause of all of Iraq’s problems.”
Student
Baghdad, May 2008
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In addition, US domestic pressure is mounting over the spiralling cost of the Iraq war, and
it is likely that continuing to fund the Sons of Iraq/Concerned Local Citizens groups is
unsustainable for the United States even in the medium term. However, a failure by the
US to balance any cut in funding with sustainable livelihood opportunities could be
perceived as a broken promise, and the resulting disillusionment could result in Sunni
armed groups turning back to Al Qaeda in Iraq or disruptive criminal activity like drug
smuggling.