ICOS has maintained an operational base in the southern provinces of Afghanistan since 2004. Initially aimed at providing a firsthand view of the burgeoning opium trade, this local presence in Kandahar and Helmand has enabled us to develop an expertise in many of the issues associated with poppy cultivation.

A particular area of focus has been the resurgence of the Taliban, the movement’s increasing capacity to disrupt security around the country, and international responses to that threat. As the revitalised Taliban has entrenched itself, so the capacity of NATO forces to prevent the contagion from spreading has been increasingly challenged, and the inability of the international community to respond adequately to that resurgence exposed.

Building upon this foundation, ICOS broadened its examination of other key theatres within the War on Terror, launching a research platform in Somalia – the first outside of Afghanistan – in March 2008.

On the ground research in May 2008 a third conflict zone – Iraq – led to this report, and prompted ICOS to consider an alternative approach to global security issues. In this report we offer a Situation Report (SITREP) on Iraq, as well as the initial findings from a series of interviews conducted in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia, and an examination of what we believe the study of the three conflicts tells us about current global security policy.

Current situation: War on Terror and unintended consequences

The defining event of the post-Cold War era was 9/11. US desire to prevent a repeat of these unprecedented attacks upon its soil has dominated its outward projection. In the immediate aftermath, its desire for tangible results prompted it to deploy its overwhelming military machine against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Longer term ramifications saw it invade Iraq and inch towards direct confrontation with Iran.

Such was the level of international sympathy for the US following 9/11, and antipathy towards a Taliban movement long suspected of harbouring international terrorists, that the US had little trouble in amassing a ‘Coalition of the Willing’ and ousting the Taliban with lightning speed.

The ‘success’ of Afghanistan was followed in 2003 with an invasion of Iraq. However, where the ouster of the Taliban had broad international backing, military action in Iraq was fiercely contested on the international stage. Many key states viewed the US as going to war on a false prospectus, and while the moral arguments were clear (if not widely accepted), the legal basis was far from concrete.

The stated desire of the US to imprint a western democratic model upon states with no experience of such systems formed a key element of their casus belli in Iraq, as did America’s right to strike with impunity under the War on Terror justification. Some five years after the Iraq intervention, the US now finds itself in a quagmire which has invoked a collective sense of reluctance amongst the international community to intervene. This collective stasis is being exploited by a raft of non-state actors that are able to exploit such uncertainly to their own advantage. These range from organised crime groups to militant Islamists, both of which are able to recruit disenfranchised and angry young men with no optimism for their futures.

An absence of clearly articulated boundaries in the War on Terror has left the US unchecked on the international stage. A focus upon defeating terrorist groups has left other developmental requirements floundering. The need to create real stability, real prosperity and states friendly both politically and economically has been overlooked in global security objectives.

New global security policy paradigm needed

Field research in three War on Terror theatres has demonstrated either deepening (Afghanistan, Iraq) or chronic (Somalia) conflicts. The current approach is ill-equipped to deal with these problems, and simply cannot cope should another global security crisis require action. A new approach to addressing security challenges is desperately required, and must contain broad measures of success.

Successful resolution of the multi-faceted problems thrown up by conflicts in the current War on Terror theatres requires nuanced policies aligned with defined measures of success. Creating the stability and prosperity required to establish a politically and economically friendly member of the international community are core elements of making a success of post-conflict states.

1. Stability: The first measure of success in any conflict is stable government. Winning the hearts and minds of locals and helping them to achieve sustainable peace will provide a stable platform from which to re-orientate the international community’s interventions.
2. Prosperity (Employment, Development and achievement of Millennium Development Goals): Field research shows that unemployment and limited livelihood opportunities represent two of the biggest drivers of conflict among young, disenfranchised populations. Employment development and achievement of Millennium Development Goals must be viewed as security instruments.
3. Friendly political and economic climate: A third measure of success is that the population in conflict theatres actively opting in to the international community as a politically and economically friendly member.

"Door Number Three" for Iraq

A flawed logic has come to dominate the policy debate on Iraq; hence, current thinking revolves around two propositions – should we stay or should we go? With the human and financial cost of ongoing operations spiralling out of control, an increasingly vocal caucus on Capitol Hill is calling for the establishment of a viable exit strategy. However, the fragile security situation and limited strength of Iraq’s democratic institutions militate against a rapid withdrawal.

Similarly, remaining in situ for an indeterminate length of time cannot be viewed as a viable option either. With US forces fatigued and budgets overstretched, the tempo of operations required to keep the insurgency on the back foot is not sustainable, either on the ground in Iraq or in the US domestic theatre.

Therefore, a ‘Door Number Three’ is needed to escape the stay or go debate and the related fixation on ‘defeating the enemy.’ These provide the wrong lenses through which to examine (or even frame) the issues invoked by Iraq, and lead reflexively to an over reliance upon traditional military responses.

As well as top-down security initiatives which focus on defeating the country’s armed groups and militias, a key element of security strategy in Iraq must be to sell a ‘democracy surge’ to ordinary Iraqis, by meeting their security needs. This also means avoiding the sectarian political trap.

The recent growth of Concerned Local Citizen groups from Sunni areas to include the predominantly Shia regions of Iraq is a positive step towards the provision of pan-sectarian security. Indeed, bridging the sectarian security divide is a necessary step to help the US avoid the situation where they are paying, fighting, and dying to build a severely flawed ‘democracy’. However, anchoring democracy in Iraq will require the sustainable security that can only be guaranteed through the active participation of Iraqis at all levels of society. To build a real democracy in Iraq, US security efforts in the country should support grassroots micro-security initiatives, centred in local communities, and which focus on addressing the grievances that prompt angry young men to take up arms.

The Iraq war has had a staggering financial and incalculable human cost. Tens - perhaps hundreds - of thousands of lives have been lost (the overwhelming majority of which have been innocent Iraqi civilians, with 4,100 US forces also losing their lives) and over four million people displaced both inside and outside of the country. It has cost hundreds of billions of dollars, destabilised an already precarious region, provided a recruitment tool for militant Islamism, and undermined America’s standing in the world. The United States’ enduring over-reliance upon military power to force peace throughout Iraq has come at a huge cost to the indigenous population, regional stability, the international community and American taxpayer.

A way forward....
The international community must be seen to contribute to improving everyday life, most urgently through the provision of humanitarian aid and the repatriation millions of refugees. Should it not be possible for NGOs to deliver aid, then the military must be empowered to meet that critical human need. International involvement must cease to be associated with aggressive military tactics or oil exploitation but instead with positive action as defined by the Iraqis themselves.

Disenfranchised population groups (e.g. young men) need to be given an outlet to voice their frustrations, and a firm prospect of employment. The need for a ‘job surge’ and capital is fundamental to Iraq’s capacity to build a successful future. Foreign investment should be viewed as a security tool. A ‘job surge’ of sustainable, well-paid jobs, ideally backed by ‘micro-credit’ disbursed by local small to medium enterprises, is a realistic way of kick-starting employment opportunities in the country. The population’s immediate postconflict needs must be met.

Quick Impact Projects should be beneficial and seen to come from the local/national governance structures rather than Private Military Companies or local militias. ‘Microsecurity’ initiatives should be established whereby the macro-level goals of development and employment are applied to both individuals and their communities. Boosting employment through the creation of localised, Iraq-branded ventures will enhance security at both the micro and macro levels.

Towards a New Global Security Architecture

The ongoing mismanagement of the conflicts in three of the main War on Terror conflict theatres indicates that the current global architecture for conflict resolution and prevention will not easily facilitate the achievement of such measures of success. In fact, creating and implementing a ‘Door Number Three’ for Iraq (as well as Afghanistan and Somalia) would mean struggling against the current architecture. As such, there is a need for a New Global Architecture.

Following 9/11, the nature of conflict discourse was suddenly dictated by a superpower reeling at its inability to protect its previously insulated civilians from large scale terrorist attack. Abrasive rhetorical references such as ‘global jihadist terrorism’, ‘axis of evil’, ‘with us or against us’ and, most famously, the War on Terror came to dominate US thinking. The varying hues of conflict strategy had been shoehorned into a simple binary choice, and the world continues to deal with that legacy.

This approach has excluded many states from global security and state-building efforts. They are now are extremely reluctant to become involved in the crucial post-conflict reconstruction phases in Afghanistan and Iraq, and have are less likely to participate in future interventions. Moreover, states with Muslim majorities have largely fallen well outside of this new order.

There is manifestly a requirement for a new architecture to deal with conflicts and in particular the War on Terror. More is needed than a quick change in policy, and it is not sufficient to change the rules; the entire game is in need of overhaul. We must first acknowledge that the current architecture does not work, and we need a new Global Security Architecture. The journey towards the framing of this is as important as the destination - all shades of opinion must feed into this discussion.

Present inadequacies are combining to jeopardise efforts at vanquishing global security threats and managing current conflicts, and include:

1. insufficient troop levels
2. an outmoded Security Council structure
3. the aid/development community’s inability to provide the full spectrum responses
necessary to ensure aid is delivered in conflict zones

This new system of conflict management must plan for the worst situation while hoping for the best. There must be sufficient contingency planning to handle with the most complex of security challenges. Unfortunately, the present infrastructure cannot respond effectively to what we have now, let alone future worst case scenarios.

In the new Global Security Architecture we need to retain the classic instruments of military power and intelligence, but also consider non-military tools as security instruments with the same political and financial support as military and intelligence endeavours: employment, achieving the Millennium Development Goals, capital investment, targeted foreign direct investment, human rights, civil society and an independent media.

This New Architecture must provide a structure for intervention as a threat containment tool. It must establish a pathway to security by minimising and eradicating current threats, preventing them from escalating into full-blown insurgencies, and starving militant Islamist groups of the oxygen they need to survive.