2.2 Conflict Dynamics
Somalia has been a de facto collapsed state for almost two decades. Efforts at political consolidation and stability have materialised, leading to the effect disintegration of the state. In the absence of credible and functioning government institutions, widespread disorder and insecurity have thrived, in turn allowing extremism to grow and international militant Islamists to use Somalia as a staging post. Somalia’s barely functioning transitional government has also permitted neighbouring countries and foreign powers to intervene, further undermining Somalia’s national unity and entrenching divisions.
A combination of unrelenting internal and external dynamics has aggravated security and living conditions in Somalia. With millions of Somalis experiencing the catastrophic effect of this intractable and multifaceted conflict, hopes for a viable peaceful solution are becoming increasingly bleak.
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“What is really striking about Somalia is the lack of engagement from the International Community: ‘don’t want to know, it’s too difficult, we don’t have the capacity, someone else should deal with it’.”
Member of the international community
Nairobi, March 2008
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Primacy of clan affiliation
The traditional Somali society is primarily lineage-based with clan affiliation being a principle source of identity. Seventeen years of disorder and a flagging sense of national unity have allowed clans and sub-clans to mobilise and become the dominant political factor at the local and national level, providing the basis for human security. Their political primacy over the moderate practice of Sufi Islam has also been palpable, with Sufi brotherhoods often complementing the clan dominance. Notably, clans and sub-clans have control over different regions and cities in Somalia; the Hawiye clan holds the greatest influence in the capital Mogadishu whilst the Ayr sub-clan controls most of Galguduud and the Lower Shabelle region. Conversely, the Darood/Marehan sub-clan controls mainly the Gedo region and the town of Kismayo.
Somali clans and sub-clans do not share a unified political stance and, though they can be conducive to Somalia’s political reconciliation, they can equally prove to be the most important spoilers in the reconciliation process.
“The clans can be a force for good or for bad. The bad aspects are the revenge killings, the forced marriages, and the violence. But in rural areas, the clans provide social cohesion and support systems.”
Elder
Mogadishu, March 2008
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The TFG is dominated by the Darood/Majerteen, Hawiye/Abgal and Rahanwein clans and sub-clans, and also includes several warlords and factional elements aligned with the Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council. This alignment with the TFG, however, is not consistent and there are sub-clans that have actively opposed the transitional government on certain issues and have built coalition with opposition groups. For instance, though the Darood/Marehan sub-clan declares its loyalty to the TFG, the group has control over the Kismayo town, which is currently in a state of rebellion and had recently driven TFG forces out of the town. Conversely, the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts is primarily dominated by the Hawiye clan, though no longer clearly led by the Ayr sub-clan. Parts of the Hawiye clan are considered central to Somalia’s conflict and, as such, encompassing these groups within a genuine reconciliation process would be instrumental to building lasting peace.
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Steady flow of arms into Somalia
In January 1992, the UN Security Council, alarmed at the rapid deterioration of the situation in Somalia and concerned that the continuation of the conflict is a threat to international stability and peace, called on all states to refrain from any action conducive to increasing tension in Somalia, imposing an arms embargo upon the country (Resolution 733). In the years to come, notwithstanding proclamations to refrain from any action in contravention of the arms embargo, there have been continuing violations. Notably, arms shipments from Ethiopia to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Eritrea to Islamic militias respectively have continued, further impeding efforts to establish security in Somalia through a peaceful political settlement.
The UN Security Council has repeatedly condemned the significant increase in the flow of weapons and ammunition supplies to and through Somalia, calling primarily on regional states to take all necessary steps to hold violators accountable. In its Resolution 1724 (2006), the Security Council sought to further promote compliance by requesting the re-establishment of the Monitoring Group to investigate violations and to facilitate the implementation of the arms embargo; the Group, which also operated in 2004 and 2006, was re-established in July 2007 for a period of six months.
The Monitoring Group has identified a number of countries violating the arms embargo in Somalia – in addition to Ethiopia and Eritrea, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Uganda and Yemen were cited as violators.
Although the weapon markets were ostensibly shut down by the TFG, the trade has continued to flourish underground, and the main flow of arms into Somalia currently passes via Bosaso, the north-east port city nominally aligned with the TFG. Almost all weapons confiscated by the TFG and other militias are resold on the weapon markets in Mogadishu.
In recent months, prices for a lot of weapons have dropped significantly; for instance the price of a second-hand AK-47 was around USD 200 in May 2007 while field research conducted in March 2008 suggests this may now be as low as USD 150. Notably, the equivalent prices in Kandahar City and Lashkar Gah, the two cities in the southern part of Afghanistan where the Taliban insurgency is strongest, are USD 275 and USD 400 respectively.
“People have fled; you cannot imagine the fighting we have seen.”
Elder
Mogadishu, March 2008
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Foreign intervention undermining conciliatory efforts
- Ongoing Ethiopian military action in Somalia
Ethiopia has striven to promote its own strategic agenda in Somalia, to offset the influence of its neighbouring adversary Eritrea, which has purportedly been arming and financing the insurgency in the country. The two countries are essentially conducting a proxy war in Somalia. By late 2006, Ethiopia had deployed up to 30,000 troops to Somalia in support of the TFG, to defend against the threat that Somali Islamist groups could pose to Ethiopia. The Ethiopian government attempts to conceal the financial and human costs of maintaining its military mission in Somalia, though it is reported that over 200 Ethiopian soldiers have been killed since their unofficial deployment in November 2006, and their subsequent official deployment in December 2006.
Four weeks after Ethiopia’s December 2006 intervention in Somalia, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi attempted to remove Ethiopian troops from the country, urging the African Union to support TFG security forces during the pull-out process. Nonetheless, so far, despite the presence of 2,400 Ugandan and Burundian African Union troops, several thousand Ethiopian troops are still operating in Somalia at an increasingly grave cost to both Ethiopia and Somalia. In particular, the continued presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia has undermined the TFG’s independence and credibility as a national entity.
The dynamics of the relationship between Ethiopia and the US also brings to light drivers behind Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia. The Ethiopian Government believes it has a lot to gain from its alliance with the US, especially regarding its rivalry with Eritrea and, thus, it has overall sought to keep its powerful ally content with its intervention in Somalia.
The Republican US Administration, for its part, considers Ethiopia’s contribution significant in fighting terrorism in Somalia and counter-balancing those regional countries which allow extremism to flourish. Although the US officially contributes only a fragment of Ethiopia’s defence budget, there has been speculation that it has helped pay for the rising costs of Ethiopia’s army and that the Pentagon wishes to make Ethiopia a bulwark in the region.
“The United States bringing Christian Ethiopians, who have been our enemies for centuries, in here to support a puppet government, is like putting the Jews in to run Palestine.”
Identity withheld
Mogadishu, March 2008
“The Government is in the hands of the Ethiopians, who for centuries have been the enemy of the Somali people. Ethiopia is controlling the situation in a way that is not acceptable to Somalis.”
Identity withheld
Mogadishu, March 2008
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- US interference in Somalia to fight terrorism
The US intervention in the Horn of Africa region - and Somalia in particular - is projected as part of its global War on Terror. With lawlessness and extremism thriving in Somalia, the country has been identified by the US as a safe haven for international terrorists. Accordingly, the US has recently unleashed a series of attacks targeting suspected Al-Qaeda operatives and training bases on Somali soil. As a result, numerous civilian casualties had been reported, fuelling public frustration against American intervention in the country as well as against the TFG for its complicity in the foreign interference.
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“The psychological effect of the US bombings is very significant. Everyone is horrified by these actions. They cannot be justified. They never hit any bad people.”
Government supporter
Mogadishu, March 2008
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In addition to its militarised intervention in Somalia, the US Administration has frustrated efforts to promote a genuine and all-inclusive reconciliation process in the country. The US has been directly funding selective departments of the TFG and has supported Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf in his efforts to undercut Prime Minister Hussein’s reconciliatory efforts. In February 2008, the US government disrupted negotiation talks with all opposition parties - including hardline Islamists - by exerting pressure on the prime minister to exclude certain groups and individuals from a reconciliation process, particularly those included in the US list of designated terror suspects.
Effectively sabotaging the prime minister’s efforts to reach out to radical elements, on 29 February 2008 - shortly before a US air strike near the Somali-Kenyan border - the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice designated Al-Shabab as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224. Even though Al-Shabab enjoys little public support in southern Somalia, the untimely announcement of the designation was criticised by Somali opposition groups and the wider public.
“The Shabab are a product of the United States’ policies here. They are a mirror image. If the United States and Ethiopia stay in the country the Shabab garden will grow. If they leave, Al-Shabab will not be necessary.”
Identity withheld
Mogadishu, March 2008
“The designation of Al-Shabab as terrorists completely undermined what the Prime Minister is trying to do: it really makes you doubt the US commitment to the reconciliation process.”
Landowner
Mogadishu, March 2008
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In its statement which was released on 18 March 2008, the US State Department underlined that –
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“Al-Shabab is a violent and brutal extremist group with a number of individuals affiliated with Al-Qaeda. Many of its senior leaders are believed to have trained and fought with Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Al-Shabab has used intimidation and violence to undermine the Somali government and threatened civil society activists working to bring about peace through political dialogue and reconciliation. The group scattered leaflets on the streets of Mogadishu warning participants in last year’s reconciliation conference that they intended to bomb the conference venue. Al-Shabab promised to shoot anyone planning to attend the conference and to blow up delegates’ cars and hotels. Although Al-Shabab did not carry out these particular threats, the group has claimed responsibility for shooting Deputy District Administrators, as well as several bombings and shootings in Mogadishu targeting Ethiopian troops and Somali government officials. Al-Shabab’s leader, Aden Hashi Ayrow, has ordered his fighters to attack African Union (AU) troops based in Mogadishu. Ayrow has also called for foreign fighters to join Al-Shabab in their fight in Somalia. Given the threat that Al-Shabab poses, the designation will raise awareness of al-Shabab’s activities and help undercut the group’s ability to threaten targets in and destabilize the Horn of Africa region.” |
Furthermore, as part of its strategy to reverse radicalisation and fight terrorism in the Horn of Africa region, the US Government considers Eritrea a pariah state, accusing its government of arming and financing the insurgency in Somalia. If the US insists on designating Eritrea as a “state sponsor of terrorism,” the dynamics within the Horn of Africa -particularly Ethiopia’s role- would change significantly and the task of achieving regional stability would become immeasurably more difficult.
“What the United States is doing in Somalia goes against all classic counter-insurgency principles and common sense. It is all based on Rumsfeld-style thinking about some sort of collective punishment for Somalia.”
Government Representative
Mogadishu, March 2008
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Privatisation of security
Governments and civilians are increasingly turning to private military companies for security provision. There is considerable debate as to whether these can provide human security and stability in those areas where public institutions are weak, as in Somalia where private security companies have now been contracted to secure the city’s Bakara market. In the absence of strong regulation, private militias and security companies are unlikely to be held accountable for their actions and it is, therefore, doubtful these can increase public security in the long run.
In Somalia, police, military and justice institutions have not been restored to full working order since the fall of the state in 1991. While competing powers recruit militias, private businesses have also contracted private military companies both in order to access markets and to create secure trading areas and routes.
At present, Somali trade is primarily protected through private security groups. In Bakara market, where household goods and weapons lie side by side, traders have taken action following a series of fires and recent attacks. Local businessmen are funding a private military company to secure the market area. Some see traders and businessmen as potential spoilers, as their private security forces represent some of the largest militias, particularly in Mogadishu. The recent market attacks by TFG forces have created frustration amongst the business community and have pushed local businessmen further into the hands of hard-line ICU elements. Reportedly, the latter enjoy the growing support and receive funding from local businessmen.
“The private security companies are really just the business community’s militias.”
Government Representative
Mogadishu, March 2008
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Locals have mixed reactions to this new development. Where there is no recourse to reliable public security, many see private companies and militias as the only viable solution. Others, however, feel it undermines the creation of legitimate security forces and amounts to protection racketeering.
Fierce competition for resources
Somalia, one of the poorest countries in the world, has been long suspected to be rich with natural resources, particularly gas and oil. These natural resources are thought to be concentrated in the Puntland peninsula in the north east of the country and to a smaller extent in the Ogaden desert. The struggle over natural resources is a cross-cutting issue both within the Somali conflict - at the tribal and institutional level, Puntland’s governance issue - and in the regional and international context.
Oil: Throughout the 17 years of disorder in Somalia, the conflict over the oil issue has intensified and the authority over oil exploration deals has highlighted the frailty of the transitional government and its dependency on warlords and feudal powers. Oil is also a stake in the international arena with the country’s potential oil industry attracting a number of international players. For instance, it is argued - though the US denied allegations - that the AMOCO, CONOCO and CHEVRON contracts in Somalia were a major consideration in the US intervention in Somalia in 1992. In recent years both China and Russia have been attempting to make deals with the Somali government for exploration purposes, whilst an Australian company is at the centre of the Puntland–Mogadishu dispute after the contract for exploration rights signed in 2005 is now contested by the TFG. Indonesian, Kuwaiti and Canadian oil companies have also negotiated deals over percentages of the Somalia Petroleum Corporation, creating further tensions. In the context of Somalia’s instability, international interest at this stage is more likely to exacerbate the conflict as opposed to fostering the economic development needed for the country’s recovery.
Water: Somalia is also facing fierce competition of another scarce resource: water. Receiving just 50 cm of water per year, Somalia suffers chronic water shortages. To date, fights between various sub-clans over water resources have resulted in considerable casualties. Decentralised traditional tribal negotiations for water sharing may be an appropriate way to resolve water conflicts between clans and sub-clans. Water is a factor of controversy also in the wider regional context, exacerbating rivalry with and between neighbouring countries Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Lack of government accountability
Public perceptions of the TFG’s legitimacy, fairness and accountability are central to Somalia’s conflict. The ICU, although it promoted radical policies whilst in power, also appealed to a common identity and created a sense of public security. In contrast, the TFG has failed to provide public order and build national unity.
“Somalia is an accountability free zone. No one is held accountable to international laws or human rights; the donors are not accountable to their own principles; the Transitional Federal Government is not accountable to its own charter, no one is accountable to the Somali people. The essential missing element is an accountability framework. There are no benchmarks, and no measures of success.”
Member of the international community
Nairobi, March 2008
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In the absence of a centrally administered trained police service and an independent judiciary, legal judgment and actions are taken on an arbitrary basis, engendering a widespread sense of impunity. Corrupt officials and TFG soldiers engaging in widespread looting, arbitrary arrest, kidnapping and killing have undermined public trust toward President Abdullahi Yusuf and his administration. The vast majority of the Somali population now considers that decisions taken by TFG officials lack the necessary transparency, credibility and accountability.
Furthermore, in view of the fact increased international donors’ pledges result in only a fraction of these actually being disbursed and reaching the poor and vulnerable Somali groups, the population has lost faith to the international community and their TFG partner. Fund mismanagement and corruption are creating divisions and are further alienating Somalia from the TFG. Somali civil society is gradually finding a voice, calling for a broadly representative and reliable government that would provide for and protect its people. Crucially, with poor governance and violations of human rights being played to the interests of radical elements, public confidence in the TFG is crumbling.
“Warlords: this gives an important title to complete and utter criminals. Anyone with 250 men was a warlord and then the United States thought they had to give them a place at the table. These people have no good intentions. So we now have a government full of very bad actors.”
Human rights worker
Hargeisa, March 2008
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