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3. Comparison of Somalia Conflict Dynamics to Afghanistan
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The conflict theatres of Somalia and Afghanistan share a number of similarities, not least regarding the tactics, techniques and motivations utilised by their respective insurgencies. There are a number of factors that propel each militant Islamist group. For instance, the sophisticated use of propaganda in both countries has assisted in the intimidation and radicalisation of local populations. The presence of foreign forces also underpins this, with militant Islamists able to depict incoming forces as aggressive Christian armies intent upon repressing the indigenous Muslim populations. Notably, in both Afghanistan and Somalia, the current governmental authorities enjoy greater legitimacy with the international community than within their own borders.
3.1 The rise of political Islamism in Somalia and Afghanistan
There are strong historical parallels in the rise of political Islamism in Somalia and Afghanistan, and although key differences remain in substance, since 9/11, the international community has harboured fears about the ‘Talibanisation’ of Somalia. These fears were seemingly fulfilled when the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) came to power in 2004.
Both countries endured sustained periods of civil war after the collapse of weak, illegitimate and divisive states. Repression under the two ostensibly Socialist regimes politicised Islamist groups, and Islamism emerged as a powerful ideology, with the distinct capacity to mobilise across clan, tribal, ethnic and class lines. The internal legitimacy of the Taliban and ICU regimes was grounded in the ability to provide widespread, relatively inclusive security. As war and hardship took their toll, physical security became of paramount importance for vulnerable populations and the business communities in need of secure markets and trade routes.
“Local people supported the Islamic Courts because they wanted security. The safe movement of goods, security and movement of people is what people want, and if the Islamic Courts can deliver these basics, then they will be acceptable. Security is what people care about.”
Identity withheld
Mogadishu, March 2008
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By 2000, the Taliban brought Afghanistan’s warlords under control, and controlled 95% of the country. In 2006 the ICU eradicated the roadblocks manned by warring militias and brought security to Mogadishu for the first time in seventeen years, and also secured much of south-central Somalia. Both the Taliban and the ICU abstained from factionalism and controlled disciplined forces that did not rape or loot. The ICU and the Taliban both declared that terrorists caught on national soil would be tried by national courts and not handed over to the international community. However, both regimes proved short-lived: the Taliban fell after the US invasion in 2001 and the ICU fell just six months after establishing its authority, following invasion by US-backed Ethiopian troops in December 2006.
By 2000, the Taliban brought Afghanistan’s warlords under control, and controlled 95% of the country. In 2006 the ICU eradicated the roadblocks manned by warring militias and brought security to Mogadishu for the first time in seventeen years, and also secured much of south-central Somalia. Both the Taliban and the ICU abstained from factionalism and controlled disciplined forces that did not rape or loot. The ICU and the Taliban both declared that terrorists caught on national soil would be tried by national courts and not handed over to the international community. However, both regimes proved short-lived: the Taliban fell after the US invasion in 2001 and the ICU fell just six months after establishing its authority, following invasion by US-backed Ethiopian troops in December 2006.
As war continues between international forces against both the Taliban and the ICU, the differences between the regimes are also telling.
Where the ICU in 2004-6 represented an uneasy coalition of Islamist institutions, from moderate to extreme, Taliban politics are based on conservative Islam.
However, while this led to tolerance of Al-Qaeda training bases in Afghanistan, the only evidence of Al-Qaeda in Somalia has been one small cell. Although some extremist groups operate in Somalia, such as Al-Shabab, local security issues remain important and calls for international jihad have not gained significant support as yet.
Mogadishu, October 2007 (Still from “Jihad in Somalia”)
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“Somalia shares features with the Afghanistan insurgency, and there is a strong sense of frustration with the lack of response from the International Community policy community.”
Identity withheld
Nairobi, March 2008
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3.2 Tactics and drivers
As the complexities of the conflict are unravelled, it becomes apparent that there are three tiers of actors that interact for a variety of tactical and strategic reasons:
In addition to the commonality of actors, an examination of the factors that compel fighters to join militant Islamist movement is telling:
“If you don’t remove the reason why Al-Shabab exists, it will just be replaced by another group tomorrow.”
Elder
Hargeisa, March 2008
“The recent beheadings are used to exert psychological control over the population. Insurgency cannot take and hold territory, but and neither can the government or the Ethiopians. The Al-Shabab is using hit and run tactic to broaden their areas of control.”
Elder
Identity withheld
Nairobi, March 2008
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Tactical shifts in Somali insurgency
Somalia has long been considered a safe haven for terrorists, but there is little evidence to suggest that it has served this purpose on any appreciable scale. While the presence of high profile terrorists in Somalia over the years is beyond dispute, the phenomenon of beheadings and suicide attacks - traditionally associated with the Al-Qaeda/radical Islamist culture - have not been a common feature of conflict in the country.
Security reports from Somalia show that beheadings are an extremely rare event, with only a handful of cases recorded in the past three years. The earliest reports about beheadings come from the brief period of domination of the Islamic Courts Union, when its leaders allegedly put the practice into use against some warlords or threatened to use it as a religious punishment. Although still a rare tactic, on 13 March Al-Shabab fighters killed and beheaded three soldiers. Regarding the other high profile Al-Qaeda inspired tactic, suicide attacks, there are four recorded cases of such attacks in Somalia. These are invariably used as an asymmetric tool of resistance against occupying forces.
Aftermath of a car bomb, Lashkar Gah Afghanistan, November 2007
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“The extreme version of Islam is a reaction to the US policies and actions.”
Identity withheld
Nairobi, March 2008
“Al-Qaeda and others’ extreme ideologies should have met substantial resistance in Somalia as Somalis are moderate Muslims and have historically separated their religion from political or governance matters. But now the US has created this sense of being under siege and we have unified against that threat: this is creating a great political opportunity for Al-Qaeda.”
Teacher
Nairobi, March 2008
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