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Conclusion and Recommendations
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Part I - Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency
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Part II a - Losing the People
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Part II b - Losing the People
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Part 1. Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency
The international community is currently engaged in a fierce counter-insurgency struggle in southern Afghanistan.
A brief analysis of classic counter-insurgency theories demonstrates that for a counter-insurgency to be successful,
it is crucial to gain the support of the general population. This can be done by approaching counter-insurgency not only with military tactics but also, and more importantly,
by integrating development, social, political and economic concerns of the population into the overall strategy. The US and international community’s actions in Afghanistan, however, take a largely military approach in the counter-insurgency, contributing to the escalating violence in the south.
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Part 2a Losing the People
Extensive field research in southern Afghanistan reveals the extensive civilian bombings by the international community has led to a severe mistrust of the central government and foreign troops by the local population.
Interviews with the local population of southern Afghanistan also demonstrate that the Taliban is a competitive employer,
and an increasing number of locals are joining the Taliban for economic reasons.
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Part 2b. Losing the People
What can the international community do to counter the escalating insurgency?
Field research reveals a series of legitimate grievances of the Afghan population which must be addressed.
If the international community does not respond urgently to such local grievances, it risks alienating the local population and losing support.
In addition, the international community and the central government must immediately stop carrying out counter-narcotics policies which seriously undermine counter-insurgency policies in Afghanistan.
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