To start regaining the hearts and minds of ordinary Afghans, an expanded, caveatfree
‘NATO Plus’ presence must be established. It is clearly no longer sustainable for
the troops of just four core NATO member states – Canada, UK, US and the
Netherlands – plus support from such non-NATO countries as Australia to engage in
active combat against an emboldened and increasingly successful enemy.
A mandated minimum contribution from member-states
A proportional level of commitment from every NATO member state is an important
benchmark, and would send out a clear message that NATO is a unified entity with
the capacity to project itself globally. A force of 80,000 troops – over double the
present total – should be achievable within a relatively short time-frame.
“(…) this is a fox you are after so you have to put a lot of boots on the ground.”
Peter Jouvenal, former British Army officer
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Two per cent a minimum: To lay the groundwork for an expanded deployment, each
NATO state should spend at least 2 per cent of its GDP upon defence. At present
only five of NATO’s pre-1999 expansion states (France, Greece, Portugal, Turkey and
the UK), and two of its newer members (Bulgaria and Romania) meet this criteria,
prompting Jaap de Hoop Scheffer to declare that he felt ‘ashamed’ by this
discrepancy. Although an imperfect measure, it does at least provide an equitable
benchmark that will facilitate the deployment of required numbers of troops to
‘NATO Plus’.
Establish a troops deployed/GDP ratio: With approximately 40,000 soldiers,
NATO-ISAF still lacks substantial numbers of troops to be able to successfully fulfil
its mandate. This figure is equivalent to less than a quarter of the deployment of
international troops to Iraq, whereas the rugged country of Afghanistan is more
populated, and has a total area almost 50 per cent larger than Iraq. The 50,000
soldiers of the Afghan National Army (ANA) are neither numerous enough, nor
suitably equipped or trained to be able to fully complement the current
international force.
ISAF forces often manage to defeat Taliban units but are not able to permanently
defend gained terrain and thus fail to prevent insurgents from re-conquering it.
ISAF does not have enough troops in Afghanistan to make sure its victories are
followed by the establishment of sustainable control over the rural territory.
Too few troops on the ground also means that ISAF is heavily relying on air power
to keep a tactical edge on the insurgents; the intense use of air power allows ISAF
to win battles, but is resulting in a growing number of civilian casualties that make
ISAF fail to win hearts and minds, and perhaps lose the war.
The total number of international troops integrated to ISAF urgently needs to be
doubled to a minimum of 80,000 troops. Currently, NATO is in command of the
International Force and most ISAF troops are provided by NATO member states.
Nevertheless, contributions from individual countries are, even within NATO, largely
uneven when considered in proportion to their population or GDP. For instance
France and Spain are contributing less than 1 soldier per billion of GDP (measured in
USD) while the United Kingdom and Turkey each supply above 3 soldiers per USD
billion.
This disparity is hampering ISAF’s efficacy and should be reviewed to allow for an
increase in the total number of ISAF troops. Of course there is no easy answer to the
question about how precisely the burden should be shared and how much every single country should contribute. But some first approximations of a fairer deal
could involve having contributions proportional to national GDP.
Currently, The Netherlands is contributing to ISAF 2.3 soldiers per billion of GDP (in
USD). This ratio represents less than half the UK’s ratio of 3.2 soldiers per billion of
GDP, but is the double of the US figure of 1.1.
If all NATO member countries increased their contribution to ISAF to this 2.3
soldiers per billion of GDP (or maintain troop commitment when it is already
higher), the total number would increase to around 71,000 troops.
If Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy Norway, Portugal,
Spain and the United States all increased their troop contributions to a relative level
equivalent to the Netherlands, ISAF would increase by a total of 30,000 troops. In
addition to increased NATO involvement, ISAF should benefit from contributions
from non-NATO countries that also have an interest in establishing a sustainable
peace in the region. While Australia, New Zealand, and nations from the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council are already contributing to ISAF, new contributions
could enhance ISAF’s capacity and legitimacy.
In particular, participation to ISAF by more countries with significant Muslim
population would ensure that the international force could not be described as
mono-culture. A debate should be opened on to what extent ISAF should grow in
size and how that build up in capacity is to be achieved in a fair and legitimate
manner.
National Caveats lifted
NATO’s mission was hamstrung from the very outset, as a number of states were
unwilling to share the fighting burden. If the coalition has any chance of success in
Afghanistan, national caveats must be lifted immediately and states must engage
the enemy under one set of rules.
Secure Development Areas (SDAs) to be established
‘NATO Plus’ should look to establish concentrated Secure Development Areas (SDAs).
Similar to the Afghan Development Zone (ADZ), these SDAs will focus upon bringing
security to a densely populated or strategically important town, enabling nonmilitary
agencies to undertake developmental projects in a secure micro-climate.
The establishment of security for SDAs will require one set of troops to be engaged
in static security tasks, with a strong forward mobile presence aimed at preventing
the insurgency from disrupting the development work. An expanded force of 80,000
would enable a higher concentration of forces to remain in situ within strategic
towns that are desperate for reconstruction. Once firmly rooted, an SDA can become a beacon of developmental progress for other troubled parts of the country, thereby
exporting stability by example.
Increased representation from Muslim states
From an internal perspective, the overriding impression of the West’s presence in
Afghanistan is that of external aggressor. Such a perception has historically
congealed Afghan resistance of all hues against that presence, prompting an
expedient coalition intent upon expelling them from the country. Indeed, much of
the Taliban can be viewed through such a lens.
To at least partially counteract that perception, deployments from Muslim states
should serve within a ‘NATO Plus’ force, primarily within the SDA serving as
community liaison officers. This addition to NATO’s presence in Afghanistan will
have tremendous symbolic value, bolstering efforts to win over local hearts and
minds, and helping NATO to project itself in means other than military operations. A
contingent of Muslim forces should also be detached to fight alongside NATO forces
entering Pakistan. Senior Muslim military figures should also be seconded to work
alongside NATO commanders in ISAF headquarters in Afghanistan.
“The Jihad movement must come closer to the masses. We must win the people’s
confidence, respect and affection. The people will not love us unless they felt
that we love them, care about them and are ready to defend them.”
Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al-Qaeda ideologue
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Support provided to Pakistan in missions against radical Islamists
An expanded ‘NATO Plus’ force would offer support to the Pakistani military’s already
extensive mission to defeat militant Islamists in its troubled western provinces. This
support would range from the sharing of tactical intelligence assets (for instance,
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle target imagery) to air support and tightly-targeted ground
assaults upon high value insurgent targets. ‘NATO Plus’ support would serve under
the operational control of Pakistan, and maintain the lightest possible footprint
during lulls in combat to mitigate against insurgent strikes upon forward operating
bases.
‘Afghan COIN’ adopted
To win hearts and minds, it is incumbent upon the forces operating in Afghanistan
to adopt a different approach to the realities on the ground. An increasing recourse
to airstrikes in densely populated areas is proving disastrous for the military’s
standing amongst local communities, and should be stopped. It is pivotal that the
political and physical sanctuaries within which insurgents operate is shrunk, and
SDAs established in their place.
To achieve this outcome, the military must shift from a counterterrorism-led
approach to a counter-insurgency (COIN)-driven one, such as advocated by former Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) chief General David Barno. The adoption of such
tactics by an expanded ‘NATO Plus’, adapted to the Afghan theatre, will provide for a
more effective prosecution of a core stabilisation strategy. The role of Muslim
military liaison officers will be key in this regard, as these forces will offer strategic
advice to Western forces regarding suitable methods of engagement with locals.
Intelligence-driven approach
A greater emphasis upon intelligence, in particular, human intelligence (HUMINT) is
required. This intelligence-driven approach should see the ‘NATO Plus’ strategy
concentrate upon the needs and security of the population, although clearly the
short-term operational requirement to defeat the insurgency militarily must
continue in tandem.
The traditional methods for gathering intelligence developed during the Cold War
have been proven consistently ineffective against the new terrorist networks of
today. Therefore, in order to conduct a successful COIN plan, it is imperative to
operate at the grass-roots level, establishing a relationship of trust with the locals,
who are historically suspicious of any outsiders (particularly in the Afghan context).
Marginal insurgents reintegrated
Vast swathes of the Taliban are fighting for economic as opposed to ideological
reasons. Establishing viable, sustainable alternative income sources in secure
environments will deprive the movement of a core membership strand.
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