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Chapter IV : International Community is Part of the Governance Crisis in Afghanistan
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| Summary: |
A crisis of governance in Afghanistan
Conclusions and Recommandations
Field Report: Central government of limited importance to Afghans
International Community is Part of the Governance Crisis in Afghanistan
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A. Ticking the Boxes: Establishing a Democratic Afghanistan
B. Reality bites: Decentralised political power in Afghanistan
C. Five years on, Afghans perceive their Government as ineffective and inadequate
D. International interference inflaming insecurity
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| Summary: A Crisis of governance in Afghanistan
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When the United States-led coalition invaded Afghanistan and removed the Taliban from power in 2001, expectations were high. Promises of democracy, economic development and a permanent end to the conflicts that have ravaged Afghanistan for decades generated euphoric levels of goodwill among the Afghan population. However, five years later, it is clear that this window of opportunity has been squandered.
During the past five years, there have been some limited achievements in Afghanistan related to classic Western post-conflict benchmarks, including democratic elections, the involvement of women in high-level decision-making and the creation of a written constitution. Yet these visible achievements, frequently lauded in the West, mask its lack of independence and the growing irrelevance of the Afghan government to the Afghan people. Essential ‘governmental’ services such as public infrastructure, health, education, and physical security are either missing or insufficient, and when available, are generally being provided by the international community or non-governmental organisations. Rather than guaranteeing economic security, the Afghan Government has been strongly urged by the United States and United Kingdom to implement counter-narcotics policies that directly attack the survival strategies of millions of Afghans.
Five years of evidence demonstrates that frequently, it is the international community which determines the Afghan Government’s domestic policies. Yet the policies being pursued by the international community are not relevant to the local context, and have prioritised Western ideals over political pragmatism. Increasingly, Afghans perceive that their government is accountable to these international donors, and not to the Afghans themselves. In establishing democratic institutions the international community raised expectations, yet stood back as the US and the UK undercut the Afghan Government’s ability to deliver on these expectations by forcing the adoption and implementation of militaristic counter-narcotics policies. Afghanistan’s counter-narcotics policies exemplify how the international community has undermined the Afghan Government by dictating its priorities and the sequencing of its policies, thereby preventing it from legitimising its existence to the Afghan people. The international community has undercut the Afghan Government’s capacity to respond to the current hunger crisis in southern Afghanistan and the return of the Taliban.
As well as funding the Afghan government and the majority of available public services, the international community continues to provide the bulk of the Afghan Government’s security forces, yet these international military forces are not answerable to the Afghan Government. Reckless actions by international military forces are further deteriorating relations between the locals and the Afghan Government: Afghans increasingly see their government as unable or unwilling to stop the international military coalitions from killing Afghan citizens.
Following from the international community’s failure to engage with Afghan communities, five years of nation-building efforts in Afghanistan have essentially been based on a misconception of Afghanistan’s political realities. In Afghanistan, power is largely decentralised, vested in strong local control structures and in regional power-holders. Because these political realities are overlooked or ignored, the Afghan Government has not been able to consolidate its power or extend the rule of law outside the main population centres. The international community now finds itself in the uncomfortable position of maintaining an ineffective, unpopular government which is increasingly viewed as illegitimate.
In several of Afghanistan’s provinces, the Taliban is now providing governmental services such as justice and economic security. It provides physical security through fighting the eradication forces that come to destroy farmers’ livelihoods and in doing so is far more effective at winning ‘hearts and minds’ than the international troops. The Taliban now has psychological and de facto military control of half of Afghanistan. Unless the international community takes account of these realities, integrates the Afghan Government with local institutions, and improves the political security and legitimacy of the Kabul government, Taliban control is set to engulf the rest of Afghanistan.
Conclusions
Many Afghans consider their government unable to deliver
In the eyes of many Afghans, the Afghan Government is seen to fulfil the international community’s idealistic need for a democracy in Afghanistan rather than their own. For most Afghans, systems of local social-control are the real power brokers and service providers. The Afghan Government is seen to be run by Afghans for isolated interests.
Legitimacy of Afghan Government undermined by US and UK military and counter-narcotics policies
The Afghan Government’s incapacity to deliver essential goods and services to the people of Afghanistan further detracts from its already weak legitimacy for the majority of Afghans. Compounding this is its inability to prevent the international community from pursuing destructive counter-narcotics activities in the country. The international community is undercutting the Afghan Government’s legitimacy in countless ways.
Government losing legitimacy in face of Taliban resurgence
The Afghan Government is losing its legitimacy with its incapacity to provide for the basic needs of its population, and incapacity to prevent the harmful practices and side effects of the international military forces in the country. The Taliban is seizing on this power vacuum by providing some of the services which should be delivered by the Afghan Government, further fuelling its resurgence.
Recommendations
Recommendation I: The international community must facilitate the integration of local Afghan governance systems with the Afghan Government
Democratic institution-building must pragmatically adapt to the conditions and realities of local Afghans. The international community must stop undermining the Afghan Government. Instead, the international community must engage with local Afghans to collaboratively devise new approaches which build on and mobilise local systems of social control.
Recommendation II: The Afghan Government must have its own budget
Existing forms of international aid delivery are unsustainable and undercut the Afghan Government’s budget. To effectively provide the services its citizens desperately need, the Afghan Government must have its own budget. Poppy licensing has the potential to turn the untaxed profits from poppy cultivation into a source of legal revenue for the government.
Recommendation III: Fortify government’s legitimacy to counter rise of Taliban
The international community must urgently shift its priorities in Afghanistan to enhance the Afghan Government’s capacity to tackle Afghanistan’s poverty and security crises.
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Field Report: Central government of limited importance to Afghans
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The Taliban’s extended control over southern Afghanistan is evident in the dress and constrained mobility of local populations, as well as in their extreme reluctance to be associated with foreigners: “If I go with you today, I will be arrested tomorrow”.
Desperate need for food and services
Afghan people in southern Afghanistan see their central government as detached from their real needs: starving villagers in rural Kandahar could only say “we need food, God help us. We need food.” To these people the Afghan Government means nothing and does nothing for them; inhabitants in a number of rural villages have never encountered anyone from Kabul or Kandahar local government, or any international aid workers.
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“We are not stupid. We see what is happening”
Villagers, Kandahar province
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If the international community arrived with money and help then it would mean something, but as they have nothing to offer and never come out to the villages, they mean nothing . What the Afghan Government really needs is money; without it, they have “no way to help anyone.” A local Afghan asserted that “democracy is important according to your culture but according to our culture feeding our children is more important. ” Poverty and disease persist, and the Afghan Government therefore seems incapable of delivering essential services.
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“They are all lying to us, and they are all lying to you”
Villager, Kandahar province
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No sign of help
Just one hour out of Kandahar City, there are no foreigners to be seen, and rural villages targeted by international military forces have not been assisted in the treatment of civilian casualties . Doctors in Kandahar have not seen evidence of foreigners working with the Afghan people or with the Afghan doctors. Some villages have never received visits from representatives of the Provincial Reconstruction Team. This is despite an assurance from an ambassador that the international military forces “go out of their way” to deal with civilian casualties. One hospital administrator said he had never heard the promise of international military forces, nor has he seen any evidence of the promise being fulfilled when victims arrive at the hospital. He said “if that was happening I would have heard about it, as they tell me all about what happens during the bombings.”
Money badly spent
Afghans believe that money has been badly spent on ineffective policies manipulated by the West. A member of parliament from Kandahar province believes money spent on the elections for the new government should actually have been spent on relieving the conditions of the poor. Another example of policy failure was the establishment of the currency exchange in Kandahar which according to people in Kandahar was ineffective and is viewed as another waste of money. In southern and eastern Afghanistan most people are still using Pakistani rupees and have never even used Kabul’s official currency .
The counter-narcotics policy demonstrates that the parliament is preoccupied with satisfying Western demands above the real needs of the people. Through spraying and eradication, the counter-narcotics policy, along with drought, means that they were yielding only twenty-five percent of normal output. The reputation of the international community’s five-year mission is ruined.
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“When you first came here we were so glad to see you. Now we have lived with you in our country for five years and we see you tell a lot of lies and make a lot of false promises”
Villagers, Kandahar province
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A need for real results
Western ideals are in turn not perceived as positive or useful and the government is perceived as easily manipulated by these ideals and unable to guarantee any security to the civilians who are still being killed. Corruption has also become common knowledge; Afghans believe the rich are getting richer, including foreigners, and many believe things were better under the Taliban. Villagers have also reported seeing a lot of government individuals in very expensive vehicles and houses so they know they are taking bribes .
People complain that “many government individuals have their families outside of Afghanistan now and have an American passport in their front pocket at all times” . People believe that the West and the government are in collaboration with each other, and do not trust them. Such distrust of the government and the international community features in locals’ attitudes towards the international community’s involvement in the drugs trade. In reference to the heroin factors, Afghans say that ”the government and internationals know they are there. It means the government and the foreigners are involved in some way”. The Afghan Government is therefore seen as hypocritical when innocent people are arrested just so that the government can say that they are exercising some sort of control. There are many rumours about the level of corruption in the government, some of which seems to be true. What is certain is that the government is powerless and its reputation is weakening among Afghan people .
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“You spent millions of dollars on this election and nothing on food for the poor”
Member of Parliament, Helmand province
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According to a former mujahedin, the Taliban are looking for payoffs from the Kabul government, and some governors who have money from the drug trade are paying them, to leave them alone. The Taliban themselves are paying local commanders to fight with them, or for safe passage through their territories, with money constantly changing hands.
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“In Afghanista], the commanders, mullahs, elders, traffickers … are the real power holders still”.
Villager, Kandahar province
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Field report conclusions
Afghans are increasingly incensed at what they perceive to be the continued failure of the international community and the Afghan Government to deliver any real results. There is a desperate need for food, healthcare and other essential services in the rural areas of Afghanistan. Most people in these areas have never seen any representatives of the central government or from the international community. The central government needs to urgently strengthen its relevance and legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan population. This is especially important given the Taliban’s growing success in exploiting local anger at the perceived incapacity of the government to achieve any real results in their lives over the past five years.
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